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The Effects of Detailing on Prescribing Decisions under Two-sided Learning
Abstract
A fundamental question in pharmaceutical marketing management is: How does the ef-
fectiveness of detailing change when additional information on drugs is revealed via patients’
experiences during the product lifecycle? To address this question, we develop a model of de-
tailing and prescribing decisions which incorporates uncertainty about the quality of drugs. Our
model assumes that not only physicians/patients, but also drug manufacturers are uncertain
about the qualities of drugs, and a representative opinion leader is responsible for updating the
prior belief about these qualities. Physicians are heterogeneous in their information sets, and
drug manufacturers use detailing as a means to increase/maintain the measure of well-informed
physicians. We explicitly model physicians’ forgetting by allowing the measure of well-informed
physicians to depreciate over time. We estimate our model using product level data of ACE-
inhibitor with diuretic in Canada. Our estimation approach allows us to control for the potential
endogeneity of detailing. The results show that our model is able to fit the diffusion pattern
very well, the effectiveness of detailing depends on the current information set and the measure
of well-informed physicians, and the role of detailing-in-utility is minimal. Using our parameter
estimates, we examine how a public awareness campaign, which encourages physicians/patients
to report their drug experiences, would affect managerial incentives to detail.
Keywords: Detailing, Prescription Drugs, Decisions Under Uncertainty, Two-sided Learning,
Representative Opinion Leader, Diffusion
JEL: C15, C35, D83, I11, I18, M31, M37, M38
1 Introduction
Many serious Adverse Drug Reactions (ADRs) are discovered only after a drug has
been on the market for years. Only half of newly discovered serious ADRs are
detected and documented in the Physicians’ Desk Reference within 7 years after
drug approval.
Lasser et al. (2002), Journal of American Medical Association
A major tool of marketing communication in the prescription drug market is detailing,
in which drug manufacturers send sales representatives to visit physicians. This type of per-
sonal selling activities allows sales representatives to directly discuss compliance information,
side-effects, and clinical studies of the drugs. One challenge in managing detailing activities
throughout a drug’s product lifecycle is that even manufacturers may be uncertain about the
product attributes of their own drugs. Although some information on product attributes is
established from clinical trials when a drug gains approval from the public health agency, many
side-effects are not revealed until a large number of patients have tried the drug (Lasser et al.
2002).
In light of an environment filled with uncertainty about efficacies and side-effects of drugs,
a fundamental question in pharmaceutical marketing management is: How does the effectiveness
of detailing change when additional information on drugs is revealed via patients’ experiences
during the product lifecycle? The goal of this paper is to provide a framework that allows
researchers to address this question. We develop a model of detailing and pharmaceutical
demand, which can be estimated using standard product level panel data that contains sales
volume, prices, and detailing efforts on drugs. To demonstrate the usefulness of our model, we
apply it to the ACE-inhibitor with diuretic market in Canada.
There has been a growing literature in economics and marketing that studies the demand
for pharmaceuticals using product level data.1 Most of these studies (e.g., Leﬄer 1981, Hurwitz
1The majority of the studies in this industry use product level data because they are the least expensive data
that could be purchased from IMS. Recently, there are a few studies which use proprietary individual level data
to study the demand for prescription drugs (e.g., Gonul et al. 2001, Crawford and Shum 2005, Wosinska 2002,
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and Caves 1988, Berndt et al. 1997, Rizzo 1999, Narayanan et al. 2004, Osinga et al. 2007)
use a reduced-form approach to provide evidence that cumulative detailing can influence the
demand for drugs. Another set of studies takes a structural modeling approach to study how
uncertainty about drug qualities affects demand (e.g., Ching 2000; 2004; 2005, Narayanan et
al. 2005, Mukherji 2002). In particular, Narayanan et al. (2005) and Mukherji (2002) use the
framework of Erdem and Keane (1996) to investigate the effects of detailing on demand, in
which they assume manufacturers use detailing to convey noisy signals about the true quality
of their products to physicians. These studies provide a useful framework for quantifying the
impact of aggregate learning on demand and how detailing affects the rate of learning when
manufacturers have complete information about the quality of their drugs. However, they have
several limitations, which we seek to address:
First, they do not take into account situations where drug manufacturers may need to learn
the side-effects and efficacy profiles of their own drugs over the product lifecycle. For drugs with
side-effects and efficacy profiles that change over time, their assumption that detailing always
provides noisy signals about the true quality would not be appropriate. Such a misspecification
could lead to biased estimates of the learning parameters. In particular, the precision of the
consumption experience signals could be underestimated.
A second limitation is that they either ignore forgetting or use a reduced-form approach
to model physicians’ forgetting via the depreciation of the detailing stock in the utility function.
By not modeling forgetting explicitly, previous studies may have underestimated the effect of
informative detailing and overestimated the effect of the detailing stock in the utility function.
A third limitation is that they either restrict physicians to possess the same information
set over time, or assume that every physician uses the same number of information signals to
update his/her prior beliefs about drug qualities in each period. As a result, their models have
restrictive substitution patterns such as IIA with respect to the effect of detailing.
Narayanan and Manchanda 2006, Dong et al. 2006). In particular, Crawford and Shum (2005) and Narayanan
and Manchanda (2006) model how an individual physician/patient learns his/her own match with different drugs.
Unfortunately, individual level data in this market is very hard to obtain.
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Finally, they do not deal with the endogeneity problem of detailing. Conceivably, when a
manufacturer updates his belief about the quality of his own drug favorably, he may react to it
by increasing his detailing efforts so as to bring this information to physicians.2 Ignoring this
endogeneity problem would potentially result in biased estimates of the parameters associated
with detailing. Nonetheless, the structural modeling literature in pharmaceutical demand that
uses product level data has so far neglected to take this endogeneity problem into account.3
To address these limitations, our model differs from the previous ones in the following ways:
(i) We assume that not only physicians/patients, but also manufacturers are uncertain about
drugs’ qualities, and they rely on a representative opinion leader to collect past consumption
experiences from patients and update the current public information sets for drugs. (ii) We
allow physicians to be heterogeneous in their information sets.4 For each drug, physicians are
either informed of its current public information set or uninformed. We allow the measure
of physicians who are informed about a particular drug to depend on its cumulative detailing
efforts. So, unlike the previous models, detailing does not provide noisy signals about the true
qualities in our model. (iii) We explicitly model physicians’ forgetting by allowing the measure
of well-informed physicians to depreciate over time.
Our focus is to model the effects of detailing on demand instead of equilibrium strategies by
manufacturers. Therefore, to take the potential endogeneity problem of detailing into account,
we extend the estimation method proposed by Ching (2000; 2005), which does not require solving
manufacturers’ optimization problem. We use a reduced form approach to model detailing as a
2Azoulay (2002) finds evidence that drug companies change their detailing efforts when new information
about their drugs becomes available in the U.S. anti-ulcer drugs market.
3As far as we know, there is only one recent structural modeling paper by Dong et al. (2006), which endog-
enizes detailing at the individual level. The endogeneity problem that they focus on is different from ours. In
their case, the endogeneity problem is due to the unobserved physician level heterogeneity. In our case, it is due
to the unobserved product characteristics because we use product level data. Another difference is that Dong et
al. (2006) do not model consumer/physician learning.
4It should be noted that Narayanan and Manchanda (2006) model heterogenous physicians’ learning. However,
they use individual level data instead of product level data. The sources of identification in our model are also
different from theirs.
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function of observed and unobserved variables that determine demand, and then jointly estimate
this pseudo-detailing policy function with the demand side model.
In addition to the economics and marketing literature on pharmaceutical industry, our
paper is related to the literature on two-sided learning. Some theoretical papers in this litera-
ture study the equilibrium diffusion pattern (e.g., Bergemann and Valimaki 1997) and pricing
strategies (e.g., Villas-Boas 2006) in an environment where both buyers and sellers are uncer-
tain about the qualities of the products and consumption signals are observed by all parties
(so that the information set is shared by all parties). Bergemann and Valimaki (2006) allow
for heterogeneous learning on the buyer’s side. Ching (2000; 2004; 2005) estimates a structural
model with two-sided learning to examine the equilibrium pricing strategies and diffusion pat-
tern empirically in the U.S. prescription drug market. However, he does not model detailing.
To our knowledge, none of the papers in this literature explicitly model buyers’ forgetting.
Our paper is also related to the one-sided learning literature. In addition to Erdem and
Keane (1996), four other papers are particularly relevant. Mullainathan (2002) studies learning
and forgetting in a theoretical model. Mehta et al. (2004) develop and estimate a structural
model of learning with forgetting using individual level scanner data instead of product level
data. Both Mullainathan (2002) and Mehta et al. (2004) do not model the effect of advertising.
Ackerberg (2003) estimates a model in which a consumer infers the value of the product to
him/her from the advertising intensity (implicitly through the signaling equilibrium). He does
not allow for consumer forgetting. Moreover, similar to Erdem and Keane (1996), he assumes
manufacturers know the true mean quality of their products. Hitsch (2006) estimates a structural
model in which manufacturers are uncertain about how consumers evaluate their products.
However, unlike our model, consumers have complete information in his model.
Although we do not model the manufacturers’ problem explicitly, as far as we know, this
is the first paper that develops an empirical structural model to study the effects of detailing
on demand, allowing for two-sided learning, physician heterogeneity in their information sets,
and physicians’ forgetting. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: First, our model
is able to generate a flexible diffusion pattern – it fits the diffusion pattern of demand very
well; Second, we quantify the marginal impact of detailing on current demand at different
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points in time and show how it depends on the measure of well-informed physicians and the
information sets; Third, we find evidence that the endogeneity problem biases the estimates of
the coefficients associated with detailing; Fourth, we find evidence that the role of detailing-
in-utility could be much smaller in our framework; Lastly, using our parameter estimates, we
conduct a policy experiment to evaluate how a public awareness campaign, which encourages
physicians/patients to report their drug experiences, would affect managerial incentives to detail.
Given our parameter estimates, we find that the marginal return of detailing has increased under
this campaign, suggesting that managers should increase their detailing efforts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background of the
prescription drug market. Section 3 describes the demand model. Section 4 describes data and
the estimation strategy. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 Background
Why would drug manufacturers be uncertain about the quality of their products during the
product lifecycle given that they developed these drugs? To understand this, it is important
for us to give some background information about the approval process of new drugs. Most
countries, including the U.S. and Canada, have a similar approval process. Drug manufacturers
are required to prove that a new drug is safe and effective before marketing it. The proof involves
a series of clinical trials, which are divided into three phases. Phase I and II studies provide
basic evidence that the drug works in a small sample of patients. Phase III studies require a
relatively larger sample of patients, which ranges from hundreds to several thousands. These
studies are designed to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the drug, wherein manufacturers
need to demonstrate that the drug works better than a placebo. Nevertheless, manufacturers
are not required to show that the new drug performs better than existing drugs that treat the
same problem. Moreover, although most public health agencies set high standards for phase III
clinical studies, it is not uncommon that they do not reveal all the side-effects, as documented by
Lasser et al. (2002). These suggest that even manufacturers may not have complete information
about the quality of their own drugs at the beginning of the product lifecycle.
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Many public health agencies such as the U.S. FDA and Health Canada recognize this fact.
This is why they establish computerized information databases for storing and analyzing safety
reports submitted by physicians, patients, and drug manufacturers.5 Public health agencies use
reports from these databases to keep track of the side-effects profile over time. If there is sufficient
evidence that a previously unknown serious side-effect is associated with a drug, they will require
the manufacturer to add more warning statements on the drug label. In rare occasions, they
may require the manufacturer stop the sale of the drug if the risks clearly outweigh the benefits.
Other channels, such as educational meetings and conferences, also provide opportunities for
health care professionals to share their patients’ experiences.
Physicians are supposed to keep themselves informed of the most updated information
for drugs. However, with many new drugs entering the market each year, it is difficult for
physicians to keep up with the enormous amount of information that changes regularly.6 Most
primary care physicians are occupied with seeing patients. It is costly for them to contact public
health agencies to learn the updated side-effects, read academic journals on recent clinical trials,
or contact opinion leaders to obtain the latest information on the benefits and risks of drugs.
They therefore rely on sales representatives as a source of information (Coleman et al. 2004,
p.179, Greider 2003, p.67). Without detailing, it is plausible that a primary care physician may
forget the information about a drug’s side-effects and effectiveness over time, and as a result,
become reluctant to prescribe the drug. There is indirect evidence that supports this hypothesis:
Caves et al. (1991) find that most drug manufacturers during the 80s dramatically reduces their
detailing efforts for drugs whose patents are about to expire, and the total demand for those
drugs typically declines over time after patent expiration.
It is possible that the presentations given by sales representatives are biased towards the
drugs they promote. This possibility appears to be well-recognized by health care professionals
(e.g., Cooper et al. 2003, Ziegler et al. 1995), and physicians are usually cautious when listening
5For example, in the U.S., drug manufacturers are required to report each adverse drug experience within 15
days of the initial receipt of the information. Physicians are encouraged to file reports to the FDA on a voluntary
basis.
6For example, the number of active drugs in the cardiovascular drug category increased from 215 in March
1993 to 294 in February 1999 in Canada.
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to the sales representatives’ claims. It is common that during their visits, sales representatives
hand out printed documents related to efficacies and side-effects of the drugs being promoted
(e.g., published academic articles about clinical trials). Although the printed documents may
not be complete, more likely than not it saves physicians’ time in gathering the related literature.
Moreover, the printed documents will likely contain accurate information. If the documents are
wrong or deliberately misleading, public health agencies could use them as concrete evidence to
file criminal and civil charges against the manufacturers.7 Although physicians may be skeptical
about the information delivered by the sales representatives, the favorable picture of the drug
presented by them may trigger physicians’ interests to learn the latest information of the drug
being promoted. They may then be more likely to read the related medical literature, or contact
peers who are opinion leaders in the related field for more information.8 One implication of this
hypothesis is that the impact of detailing on demand would depend on the actual effectiveness
and side-effects of the drug. Venkataraman and Stremersch (2006) test this hypothesis and
find that the effect of detailing is indeed higher for drugs that are more effective and have less
side-effects in three therapeutic classes: anti-cholesterol drugs (statins), gastrointestinal drugs
and erectile dysfunctions drugs. In this paper, our way of modeling detailing will be consistent
with this hypothesis.
3 Model
We now turn to discuss our model of detailing and prescribing decisions. Our framework here
extends Ching (2000; 2004; 2005), who presents the first empirical structural model that allows
both the demand side and the supply side to be uncertain about the qualities of drugs. He
studies the competition between brand-name drugs and their generic counterparts. However, as
mentioned before, he does not model detailing, which is the main focus of our paper.
7The penalty of carrying out misleading promotion is usually very high. For example, Purdue Pharma was
fined $600 million for misleading promotion of OxyContin in May 2007.
8In addition to detailing, the medical continuing education literature finds that medical journals and opinion
leaders are also the main sources of information for primary care physicians (e.g., Haug 1997, Thompson 1997).
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In our model, there are three types of agents: physicians, manufacturers, and a repre-
sentative opinion leader. There are two types of products: inside goods which represent the
products that use similar chemical compounds (so-called “me-too” drugs), and an outside good
that represents their substitutes (0). Product characteristics can be distinguished as pj and qj,
j = 1, ..., J , where pj is the price of product j, and qj is the mean quality level of product j.
All agents in the model are perfectly informed about pj, but are imperfectly informed about the
drug’s mean quality level, qj.
To capture the idea that there are opinion leaders who gather the most recent information
about drug qualities, we introduce a representative opinion leader in our model. The repre-
sentative opinion leader maintains a vector of public information sets, I(t) = (I1(t), ..., IJ(t)),
which describes the most updated belief about q = (q1, . . . , qJ) at time t based on past patients’
experiences available to the public. For each drug j, a physician either knows Ij(t), or I
p
j , which
is the initial prior that physicians have when drug j is first introduced. Let Mjt be the mea-
sure of physicians who know Ij(t). We assume that Mjt depends on the cumulative detailing
efforts at time t. There are two stages in each period. In the first stage, manufacturers choose
detailings. Given the amount of detailings, Mjt is determined for each j. Each physician makes
his/her prescribing decision based on his/her information about the drugs. In the second stage,
patients consume the prescribed drugs and some of their experience signals are revealed to the
public. The representative opinion leader then uses these signals to update I(t+1) in a Bayesian
fashion. We will describe these two stages backward.
3.1 Updating of the Information Set
A drug is an experienced good. Consumption of a drug provides information about its quality.
It is assumed that physicians and patients in the model can measure drug qualities according to
a fixed scale. For example, a patient can measure quality in terms of how long he/she needs to
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wait before the drug becomes effective to relieve his/her symptoms, how long his/her symptoms
would be suppressed after taking the drug, or how long the side-effects would last.9
Each patient i’s experience with the quality of drug j at time t (q˜ijt) may differ from its
mean quality level qj. As argued in Ching (2000), the difference between q˜ijt and qj could be
due to the idiosyncratic differences of human bodies in reacting to drugs. An experience signal
may be expressed as,
q˜ijt = qj + δijt, (1)
where δijt is the signal noise. We assume that δijt is an i.i.d. normally distributed random
variable with zero mean:
δijt ∼ N(0, σ2δ ), (2)
and the representative opinion leader’s initial prior on qj (I
o
j) is also normally distributed:
qj ∼ N(qoj , σo2j ). (3)
The representative opinion leader updates the public information set at the end of each period
using the experience signals that are revealed to the public. The updating is done in a Bayesian
fashion. In each period, we assume that the number of experience signals revealed is a random
subsample of the entire set of experience signals. This captures the idea that not every patient
revisits and discusses his/her experiences with physicians, and not every physician shares his/her
patients’ experiences with others.
According to the Bayesian rule (DeGroot 1970), the expected quality is updated as follows:
E[qj|I(t+ 1)] = E[qj|I(t)] + ιj(t)(q¯jt − E[qj|I(t)]), (4)
where q¯jt is the sample mean of all the experience signals that are revealed in period t.
10 ιj(t) is
a Kalman gain coefficient, which is a function of the variance of the signal noise (σ2δ ), perceived
9Obviously, drug qualities are multi-dimensional. Implicitly, we assume patients are able to use a scoring rule
to map all measurable qualities to a one-dimensional index. It is the value of this one-dimensional index that
enters the utility function.
10Let qj be the true mean quality level of drug j. Then, q¯jt|(κnjt, I(t)) ∼ N(qj , σ
2
δ
κnjt
).
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variance (σ2j (t)), the quantity sold at time t (njt), and the proportion of experience signals
revealed to the public (κ), and it can be expressed as:
ιj(t) =
σ2j (t)
σ2j (t) +
σ2δ
κnjt
. (5)
ιj can be interpreted as the weights that the representative opinion leader attaches to the
information source in updating its expectation about the level of qj. In particular, ιj(t) increases
with σ2j (t).
The perception variance at the beginning of time t+ 1 is given by (DeGroot 1970):
σ2j (t+ 1) =
1
1
σ2j (0)
+
κNjt
σ2δ
, (6)
where Njt(=
∑t
τ=1 njτ ) is the cumulative consumption of drug j, or,
σ2j (t+ 1) =
1
1
σ2j (t)
+
κnjt
σ2δ
. (7)
Equation (6) implies that, after observing a sufficiently large number of experience signals for
a product, the representative opinion leader will learn about qj, at any arbitrarily precise way
(i.e., σj(t)→ 0 and E[qj|I(t)]→ qj as the number of signals received grows large). We will next
turn to discuss the physicians’ choice problem and how detailing influences their choices.
3.2 Detailing and Measure of Well-Informed Physicians
There is a continuum of physicians with measure one. They are heterogeneous in their infor-
mation sets. A physician is either well-informed or uninformed about drug j. A well-informed
physician knows the current information set maintained by the representative opinion leader,
i.e., Ij(t). An uninformed physician only knows the initial prior, i.e., I
p
j = N(q
p
j
, σp2j ). This
implies that the number of physician types is 2J . Note that physicians’ initial prior Ipj could
differ from the initial prior of the representative opinion leader, Ioj .
We assume that manufacturers observe I(t) when they decide the amount of detailing,
D1t, ..., DJt. In general, the measure of well-informed physicians for drug j at time t, Mjt, is a
function of Mjt−1 and D1t, ..., DJt. For simplicity, we assume that this function only depends on
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Mjt−1 andDjt, i.e.,Mjt = f(Mjt−1, Djt). We assume that f(Mjt−1, .) is monotonically increasing
in Djt. To capture the idea that physicians may forget, we assume that f(M, 0) ≤M, ∀M .
Two remarks should be made regarding the way we model the relationship between detail-
ing and the measure of well-informed physicians. First, similar to Mullainathan (2002), we do
not allow uninformed physicians for drug j at time t to possess any Ij(t
′) for t′ < t, but Ipj . As
we mentioned above, even with our current setup, the number of types increases exponentially
in J . Although allowing physicians who “partially” forget may seem more appealing, it will
dramatically increase the size of the state space – we would need to keep track of the measure
of physicians who know Ij(t
′), for all j and t′ < t. The number of types will increase to tJ in
time t. Such a modification will make the model computationally infeasible to estimate.11 On
the other hand, our assumption is not as restrictive as it may seem. One interpretation is that
we approximate the aggregate demand from tJ types of physicians by randomizing the demand
of 2J types.
Second, we assume that Mjt depends on Djt partly because the main job of sales rep-
resentatives is to give physicians documented information about side-effects and efficacies of
the drug that they are promoting. We do not mean that physicians simply believe what sales
representatives claim during their conversations. Rather, we try to capture the intuition that
detailing would increase the chances that physicians obtain the most recent information about
the drug (by consulting their peers, reading the medical literature, etc.). This could be because
the visits stimulate their interests, increase their awareness of existing or new clinical studies,
and make it easier for them to access the relevant journal articles.
Define the average rate of forgetting, φM ≡ (M − f(M, 0))/M . We assume further that
there exists anM and an M¯ , with 0 < M < M¯ , such that φM(M) = 0 forM ≤M , φ′M(M) > 0,
φ′M(M¯) = 0, and φ
′′
M(M) < 0,∀M . The assumptions allow us to capture the following intuition.
It is likely that physicians are heterogeneous in terms of their rate of forgetting. Some physicians
who are more willing to spend time to keep up with the most recent medical literature themselves
are likely to have a lower rate of forgetting. Other physicians who prefer to spend most of their
11However, with individual level data, it is feasible to estimate a model of learning with partial forgetting
(Mehta et al. 2004).
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time seeing patients, are likely to have a higher rate of forgetting – they probably will rely more
on sales representatives to help them get the most updated information. When M is small,
we expect that most of the well-informed physicians would be those who have a lower rate of
forgetting. As M increases, we expect that the proportion of well-informed physicians who
have a higher forgetting rate would increase. On the other hand, we expect that the number of
interactions among well-informed physicians would also increase with M . They might remind
each other about how this drug works, which helps reduce the average rate of forgetting (i.e.,
the network effect). These two forces work against each other. In particular, it is likely that the
latter dominates the former when M is large, and vice versa. We therefore expect that when
M is small, φM will first increase with M at a diminishing rate. After M has passed a certain
threshold, φM will eventually decrease with M .
One might argue that the network effect could allow M to expand even without any
detailing efforts. We rule this possibility out in our model because it is inconsistent with the
stylized fact that we mentioned before: The demand for a brand-name drug typically declines
over time after a manufacturer has dramatically reduced its detailing efforts (Caves et al. 1991).
This suggests that without detailing, the measure of well-informed physicians would depreciate.
In our econometric model, we capture the relationship between Mt and (Mt−1, Dt) by
introducing a detailing goodwill stock, GIjt, which accumulates as follows:
GIjt = (1− φI)GIjt−1 +Djt, (8)
where Djt is manufacturer j’s detailing efforts in time t, and φI ∈ [0, 1] is the corresponding
depreciation rate. We specify the relationship between Mjt and G
I
jt as:
Mj =
exp(β0 + β1G
I
j )
1 + exp(β0 + β1GIj )
. (9)
Although φI is a constant, G
I
j affectsMj nonlinearly. In particular, the implied average forgetting
rate, φM , will exhibit an inverted-U shape described above.
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3.3 Prescribing Decisions
Now we turn to discuss how physicians make their prescribing decisions. Each physician takes
the current expected utility of his/her patients into account when making prescribing decisions.
Physician h’s objective is to choose dhij(t) to maximize the current period expected utility for
his/her patients:
E[
∑
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uijt · dhij(t)|Ih(t)], (10)
where dhij(t) = 1 indicates that alternative j is chosen by physician h for patient i at time t,
and dhij(t) = 0 indicates otherwise. We assume that
∑
j dhij(t) = 1. The demand system is
obtained by aggregating this discrete choice model of an individual physician’s behavior.
We assume that a patient’s utility of consuming a drug can be adequately approximated
by a quasilinear utility specification, additively separable in a concave subutility function of
drug return, and a linear term in price. The utility of patient i who consumes drug j at time t
is given by the following expression:
uijt = α− exp(−rq˜ijt)− pippjt + ζikt + eijt, (11)
where pjt is the price for product j at time t; r is the risk aversion parameter; α is the common
intercept across drugs; pip is the utility weight for price; (ζikt + eijt) represents the distribution
of patient heterogeneity; k indexes nest (i.e., inside good or outside good).12 ζikt and eijt
are unobserved to the econometrician but observed to the physicians when they make their
prescribing decisions. We assume that ζikt and eijt are i.i.d. extreme value distributed. The
exponential specification of the subutility function of drug return is known as the Constant
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility. In this specification, r represents the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion.
Note that q˜ijt is observed neither by physicians nor patients when prescribing decisions
are made. It is observed by physicians/patients only after patients have consumed the drug,
12This is equivalent to modeling physicians’ choice as a two-stage nested process, where they choose between
the inside goods and the outside good in the first stage, and then choose an alternative among the inside goods
in the second stage.
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but it remains unobserved by the econometrician. Physicians make their decisions based on
the expected utility of their patients. Let I(t) and Ih(t) denote the representative opinion
leader’s information set and physician h’s information set at time t, respectively. If physician h
is well-informed about drug j at time t, his/her expected utility will be:
E[uijt|Ih(t)] = E[uijt|Ij(t)] (12)
= α− exp(−rE[qj|I(t)] + 1
2
r2(σ2j (t) + σ
2
δ ))− pippjt
+ζikt + eijt.
If physician h is uninformed about drug j at time t, his/her expected utility of choosing drug j
becomes:
E[uijt|Ih(t)] = E[uijt|Ipj ] (13)
= α− exp(−rqp
j
+
1
2
r2(σp2j + σ
2
δ ))− pippjt + ζikt + eijt.
It should be noted that patient heterogeneity components of the utility function (ζikt, eijt) reap-
pear in the expected utility equation because they are stochastic only from the econometrician’s
point of view.
Equations (11)-(13) apply only to the inside alternatives. In each period, physicians
may also choose an outside alternative that is not included in our analysis (i.e., other non-
bioequivalent drugs). We assume the expected utility associated with the outside alternative
takes the following functional form:
E[ui0t|Ih(t)] = α0 + pitt+ ζi0t + ei0t. (14)
The time trend of the outside alternative allows the model to explain why the total demand for
inside goods may increase or decrease over time.
The quantity demand, njt, can be expressed as,
njt = Sizet · S(j|Dt, (E[qj|I(t)], σj(t),Mjt−1)2j=1; θd) + ²jt, (15)
where Sizet is the size of the market, S(j|·) is the market share of drug j, ²jt represents a
measurement error, and θd is a set of demand side parameters.
14
3.4 Empirical Implications
We now discuss some empirical implications of our model. We consider the case of two products.
In this case, there are four types of physicians (22) who differ in their information sets. Let
sjt(Ij, Ik) be the probability of choosing drug j at time t by physicians who have the information
sets Ij and Ik for drugs j and k, respectively (j 6= k). Then the market share for drug j at time
t is given by,
Sjt = MjtMktsjt(Ij(t), Ik(t)) +Mjt(1−Mkt)sjt(Ij(t), Ipk) (16)
+(1−Mjt)Mktsjt(Ipj , Ik(t)) + (1−Mjt)(1−Mkt)sjt(Ipj , Ipk),
where sjt(Ij, Ik) has a closed form expression given that we use the nested logit framework. It
follows that the marginal return of detailing on current market share for drug j is,
∂Sjt
∂Djt
=
∂Mjt
∂Djt
× {Mkt∆sjt(Ik(t)) + (1−Mkt)∆sjt(Ipk)}, (17)
where ∆sjt(Ik) ≡ sjt(Ij(t), Ik)− sjt(Ipj , Ik). Intuitively, ∆sjt(Ik) is the change in the probability
of choosing j when a physician switches his/her information set for drug j from Ipj to Ij(t),
conditional on him/her knowing Ik (= Ik(t) or I
p
k). Equation (17) shows that the marginal
return of detailing depends on ∆sjt(Ik(t)) and ∆sjt(I
p
k), which are weighted byMkt and 1−Mkt,
respectively. This weighted average is further adjusted by ∂Mjt/∂Djt. It is worth noting that
∂Sjt/∂Djt increases (decreases) with Mkt if (∆sjt(Ik(t))−∆sjt(Ipk)) is positive (negative).
Consider a situation where a new drug enters a market with a matured incumbent (in the
sense that the representative opinion leader has learnt the true quality of the incumbent, i.e.,
Ik(t) → Ik(∞)). Conditional on M , equations (16) and (17) imply that the entrant’s marginal
return of detailing will increase with its market share. Moreover, the detailing elasticity of
demand in our model could increase or decrease over time partly depending on how I(t)
evolves. In particular, even after the uncertainty about the drug quality is completely resolved,
detailing still affects demand as long as φI > 0, and its effect depends on I(t), I
p andMjt−1 (i.e.,
GIjt−1). On the contrary, previous models of learning and detailing/advertising, which follow
the framework of Erdem and Keane (1996), imply that the detailing/advertising elasticity of
demand diminishes over time as uncertainty about product quality is slowly resolved. This
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demonstrates that the empirical implications from our model are quite different from those from
the previous models.
3.5 Identification
As shown in equation (16), Sjt is a non-linear function of the structural parameters of the model,
history of sales, and cumulative detailing. This indicates that the parameters of the model can
be identified from the diffusion paths of inside goods. The new element of our learning model
is the measure of well-informed physicians. It is worth discussing how this feature of the model
helps us fit the data. Note that a traditional Bayesian learning model, which assumes the
entire population is well-informed, typically implies an S-shaped diffusion path (Bergemann and
Valimaki 1997). However, the diffusion paths observed in the data may not have such a pattern.
For example, in the market of ACE-inhibitor with diuretic which will be analyzed by our model
in the next section, the diffusion paths appear to be linear. When fitting this diffusion path, a
traditional learning model will typically underpredict and overpredict the demand in the earlier
part and the later part of the product lifecycle, respectively. Adding Mjt to a learning model
allows it to generate a more flexible diffusion path. In order to fit a linear diffusion path, we will
need to adjust the parameters of f(Mjt−1, Djt; β) so that it takes time to build Mjt and removes
the steep increasing feature of the predicted diffusion path implied by a traditional learning
model.
4 Estimation
4.1 Overview of the Data
Having described our model, we now turn to an application. We estimate our model using
Canadian data for ACE-inhibitor with diuretic, which treats hypertension. ACE-inhibitor (An-
giotensin Converting Enzyme Inhibitor) works by limiting the production of a substance that
promotes salt and water retention in the body. Diuretic induces the production and elimination
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of urine, which helps in lowering blood pressure. This class of combination drugs is usually not
prescribed until therapy is under way.
We choose Canada and ACE-inhibitor with diuretic for three reasons. First, most of the
patients who have high blood pressure are elderly, and their prescription drugs are covered by
the Canadian government. Moreover, Canada has price regulations on brand-name drugs. The
Patented Medicine Price Review Board restricts Canadian prices of patented drugs to be below
the median prices of G7 countries. There is evidence which suggests that this constraint is
binding on average (Elgie 2001). These institutional details, which suggest that price does not
play an important role in determining demand, allow us to treat prices as exogenous and focus
on modeling the effects of detailing. Second, the market of ACE-inhibitor with diuretic does
not have direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising. DTC advertising has increased dramatically in
the U.S. since 1997. It is believed that it plays an important role in the demand for prescription
drugs. However, the way that DTC advertising influences physicians’ choice is likely to be
different from detailing. Modeling the effects of DTC advertising is beyond the scope of this
paper. Third, the market of ACE-inhibitor with diuretic only has two dominant drugs. We feel
that it is sensible to first apply our framework to this simple market before tackling markets
with more competitors.
Data sources for this study come from IMS Canada, a firm that specializes in collecting
sales and advertising data for the Canadian pharmaceutical industry. The revenue data is
drawn from their Canadian Drugstore and Hospital Audit (D&H); the number of prescriptions
is drawn from their Canadian Compuscript Audit (CCA); the number of detailing minutes is
drawn from their Canadian Promotion Audit (CPA). Although D&H does not include purchases
made by the government, mail order pharmacies, and nursing homes or clinics, IMS believes
that it covers about 90% of total sales. The price is obtained by dividing the revenue by the
number of prescriptions. We deflated the prices using the consumer price index in the Canadian
pharmaceutical industry. We note that on average less than one percent of sales is from hospital
purchases. Due to its dominance, we only model the segment of the drugstore market and ignore
how hospitals reach their purchase decisions.
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The data set contains monthly data fromMarch 1993 to February 1999. There are two main
brand-name drugs in the market – Vaseretic and Zestoretic. Vaseretic is marketed by Merck; its
generic ingredients are enalapril and hydrochlorothiazide. It was approved by Health Canada in
September 1990. Zestoretic is marketed by AstraZeneca; its generic ingredients are lisinopril and
hydrochlorothiazide. It was approved in October 1992. Both of them are present throughout
the sample period, and they capture more than 80% of sales of the ACE-inhibitor with diuretic
category. We therefore focus our analysis on these two drugs. Treating product/month as one
observation, the total sample size is 144. We report the summary statistics in Table 1.
For an overview of the data, we plot the number of prescriptions filled for Vaseretic and
Zestoretic in Figure 1. The sales of both drugs increase over time. The monthly sales of
Vaseretic grow slowly and steadily from 2,500 prescriptions to 4,500 prescriptions, while Ze-
storetic’s monthly sales grow at a much faster rate from around 300 prescriptions to more than
14,000 prescriptions. Being the incumbent of the ACE-inhibitor with diuretic, the sales of
Vaseretic is about eight times that of Zestoretic at the beginning of the sample period (March
1993). It took Zestoretic more than two years to overtake Vaseretic’s sales. By the end of the
sample period (February 1999), the sales of Zestoretic is more than three times that of Vaseretic.
The sales trend of Zestoretic is remarkable, and illustrates the slow diffusion of new drugs well
documented in this industry.
The potential size of the market is defined as the total number of prescriptions for drugs
that belong to ACE-inhibitor, Thiazide Diuretic, and ACE-inhibitor with diuretic. In Figure 2,
we plot the size of the market over time. It increases from 655,000 to 860,000 during the sample
period.
4.2 Simultaneity Problem
As we argued above, we assume price to be exogenous, and focus on the potential endogeneity
problem of detailing when estimating our physicians choice model. It is plausible that man-
ufacturers observe I(t) before detailing takes place in each period. Therefore, it is likely that
detailing is a function of I(t). In particular, we expect that Djt may be correlated with E[qj|I(t)]
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and σj(t). For instance, if E[qj|I(t)] is higher than E[qk|I(t)], manufacturer j may have an in-
centive to increase Djt so as to disseminate the information. If we ignore this correlation, the
parameters for building up the measure of well-informed physicians will likely be biased upward.
A popular method to estimate this class of model using product level data is developed
by Berry et al. (1995) (BLP). They show that there is a one-to-one mapping between the mean
utility levels and the observed market shares, conditional on a parameter vector. As a result, it
is possible to construct a GMM objective function based on the mean utility function without
explicitly solving the supply side model. However, as pointed out by Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003), BLP’s GMM objective function is highly nonconvex with many local optima. This poses
a formidable challenge when minimizing it in practice. Another way to handle this endogeneity
problem is to explicitly model manufacturers’ decision on detailing, and incorporate their de-
tailing policy functions in a full-information maximum likelihood procedure. Since detailing has
a long-lived effect, this would involve developing a forward-looking dynamic oligopoly structural
model. Unfortunately, estimating this type of dynamic oligopoly model using a full-solution
method has proved to be infeasible given today’s computational power.
In this paper, we estimate our model using the approach developed by Ching (2000; 2005).
Similar to BLP, this method does not require solving the dynamic oligopolistic supply side model.
To take the endogeneity of detailing into account, he proposes to approximate manufacturers’
policy functions by expressing it as a polynomial of the state variables (both observed and
unobserved), and then jointly estimate this pseudo-policy function and the demand model.13
There are two drawbacks in this approach: (i) It increases the number of parameters
to estimate due to the pseudo-detailing policy functions; (ii) The estimates are not efficient
because the supply side model is not used in the estimation. However, this approach does not
require us to make any strong assumptions about the equilibrium solution, and whether drug
manufacturers maximize their total discounted profits or current profits. So we avoid some
risks of misspecifying the supply side, which may result in biased estimates. More importantly,
it allows us to avoid the computational burden of solving a dynamic oligopoly model when
estimating the demand model.
13This method can also be applied to address price endogeneity. See Ching (2005) for further details.
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The state variables of our model consist of (E[qj|I(t)], σ2j (t),Mjt−1)2j=1. We therefore as-
sume that the detailing policy function depends on these variables. The detailing policy function
may also depend on variables that we do not explicitly model. For instance, the total detailing
minutes by manufacturer j in the cardiovascular drug category could affect Dj. It is possible
that a manufacturer sets its detailing budget for the entire cardiovascular drug category first,
and then determines the detailing for individual drugs in the category. We therefore include
the total detailing minutes by manufacturer j in the cardiovascular drug category net Dj in the
pseudo-detailing policy function.14 This variable is useful in identifying the parameters associ-
ated with detailing in the demand model because it plays the role of exclusion restriction, and
essentially serves as an instrumental variable for Djt.
When specifying the pseudo-detailing policy function, one should use a flexible high order
polynomial to do the approximation if the sample is large. In practice, however, one may need to
make some trade-offs between flexibility and the number of parameters by choosing a functional
form carefully. After experimenting with a number of functional forms, we specify the detailing
policy function as follows: For j, k = 1, 2, and j 6= k,
log(Djt) = λj0 + (λj1 + λj2 ∗Mkt−1) ∗ (1−Mjt−1) ∗ |∆uqjkt| ∗ I(∆uqjkt > 0)
+(λj3 + λj4 ∗Mkt−1) ∗Mjt−1 ∗ |∆uqjkt| ∗ I(∆uqjkt < 0)
+λj5 ∗ IVjt + νjt, (18)
where
∆uqjkt = E[u
q
jt|I(t)]− E[uqkt|I(t)], (19)
E[uqjt|I(t)] = −exp(−rE[qj|I(t)] +
1
2
r2(σ2j (t) + σ
2
δ )), (20)
νjt is the prediction error, and I(·) is an indicator function. Note that E[uqjt|I(t)] is part of the
expected utility that depends on E[qj|I(t)] and σ2j (t).
Our model suggests that manufacturer j has an incentive to increase detailing if ∆uqjkt > 0.
Such an incentive is stronger ifMjt−1 is small because of the diminishing return of ∂Mj/∂Dj. We
therefore interact (1−Mjt−1) with |∆uqjkt| when ∆uqjkt > 0. We expect the coefficient associated
with the interaction term to be positive (i.e., λj1 > 0).
14Berndt et al. (2003), use this variable as the instrument for detailing in their reduced form model.
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Similarly, when ∆uqjkt < 0, we interact Mjt−1 with |∆uqjkt|. We expect that manufacturer
j would have less incentives to detail when Mjt−1 is large. However, when Mjt−1 is small,
manufacturer j, if forward-looking, may detail more in order to build upMj even though ∆u
q
jkt <
0. The sign of the coefficient for the interaction term (i.e., λj3) is therefore ambiguous.
As shown in equation (17), the marginal return of detailing depends on the measure of well-
informed physicians for a competing drug as well. Therefore, we also allow Mkt−1 to interact
with Mjt−1 and ∆u
q
jkt. According to equation (15), we expect the sign of λj2 and λj4 to be
positive if ∆sjt(Ik(t)) > ∆sjt(I
p
k), and vice versa.
The following two subsections describe the likelihood function and the initial conditions
problem. Readers who are not interested in details may skip to Section 5 directly.
4.3 The Likelihood Function
Assuming that the prediction error, νjt, in equation (18) is normally distributed, we obtain the
conditional likelihood of observing Dt,
fd(Dt|(E[qj|I(t)], σj(t),Mjt−1)2j=1; θs), (21)
where θs is the vector of parameters.
Assuming that the measurement error, ²jt, in equation (18) is normally distributed, and
denote fn(nt|Dt, (E[qj|I(t)], σj(t),Mjt−1)2j=1, Sizet; θd) as the likelihood of observing nt condi-
tional on (Dt, (E[qj|I(t)], σj(t),Mjt−1)2j=1, Sizet). The joint likelihood of observing (nt, Dt) is
simply the product of fn(nt|Dt, .) and fd(Dt|.):
l(nt, Dt|(E[qj|I(t)], σj(t),Mjt−1)2j=1, Sizet; θd, θs) = (22)
fn(nt|Dt, (E[qj|I(t)], σj(t),Mjt−1)2j=1, Sizet; θd)fd(Dt|(E[qj|I(t)], σj(t),Mjt−1)2j=1; θs).
Now note that σj(t) is a function of {njτ}t−1τ=1 (see (7)). Therefore, one can rewrite (22) as,
l(nt, Dt|(E[qj|I(t)], σj(t),Mjt−1)2j=1, Sizet; θd, θs) = (23)
l(nt, Dt|(E[qj|I(t)], {njτ}t−1τ=1,Mjt−1)2j=1, Sizet; θd, θs).
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The likelihood of observing n = {nt}Tt=1 and D = {Dt}Tt=1 is,
L(n,D|{E[q|I(τ)],Mτ−1, Sizeτ}Tτ=1; θd, θs) = (24)
T∏
t=1
l(nt, Dt|E[q|I(t)], {nτ}t−1τ=1,Mt−1, Sizet; θd, θs).
But E[q|I(t)] is unobserved to the econometrician and therefore must be integrated over to form
the unconditional sample likelihood for (n,D). Evaluating such an integral numerically is very
difficult. It involves high order integrals because E[q|I(t)] is autocorrelated. We resolve this
problem by using the method of simulated maximum likelihood. The details of the simulation
procedures are similar to Ching (2005).
4.4 Initial Conditions Problem
Notice that both Vaseretic and Zestoretic were introduced before March 1993, the first period
of our data set. Therefore, we do not observe the initial values of the state variables at t = 1:
GIj0, E[qj|I(1)] and σj(1). Given this initial conditions problem, consistent estimation for fixed T
requires integration over the joint unconditional distribution of the state variables at t = 1. As
discussed in Heckman (1981), this integration is extremely difficult. It requires us to explicitly
incorporate complete dynamic equilibrium since the inception of both drugs into the estimation
procedure. As discussed above, this approach is not computationally feasible at this point.
We therefore adopt a middle-ground approach. We set (DjtIj , ..., Dj0) equal to the average
Djt for the first 30 observations, where t
I
j is the period that drug j is introduced. In other words,
for t = tIj , ..., 0, we set Djt = D¯j, where D¯j =
∑30
t=1Djt
30
. Also, for t = tIj , ..., 0, we set pjt at the av-
erage observed values. For the size of market, we first run a linear regression of the size of market
on a constant and time trend and then use the predicted values to fill in Sizet, for t = t
I
j , ..., 0.
Given the imputed values of (DjtIj , ..., Dj0), (pjtIj , ..., pj0), and (SizetIj , ..., Size0), we use our physi-
cian’s choice model to simulate the unconditional joint distribution of (GIj0, E[qj|I(1)], σj(1)),
which is then incorporated in our likelihood function.
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5 Results
5.1 Parameter Estimates
We now discuss the parameter estimates. Recall that we treat Vaseretic and Zestoretic as
inside goods because they compose more than 80% of the demand for the ACE-inhibitor with
diuretic. We combine all other drugs that belong to ACE-inhibitor with diuretic, ACE-inhibitor,
and Thiazide Diuretic as the outside good. For identification reasons, we need to normalize the
scaling parameter for the number of consumption experience signals, κ, the intercept term for the
utility of the outside good, α0, and the true mean quality of Vaseretic, q1. We set κ = 1/30000,
and α0 = q1 = 0. For simplicity, we also restrict I
o
j = I
p
j ≡ Ij and σoj = σpj ≡ σ,∀j because we
do not observe the data during the initial part of the product lifecycle, which is important in
identifying their difference. We refer to I as the market initial prior.
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates. Model 1 refers to the model presented above. Drug
1 is Vaseretic (incumbent) and drug 2 is Zestoretic (entrant). The time trend of the outside good
(pit) is negative and significant, indicating that the value of the outside good relative to inside
goods is declining over time. This is consistent with the continuous expansion of demand for
both Vaseretic and Zestoretic, as shown in Figure 1. The parameter estimates for the true mean
quality and the initial priors are all statistically significant. The true mean quality of Zestoretic
(q2) is 29.04, which is higher than that of Vaseretic (q1). The initial prior mean qualities of
Vaseretic and Zestoretic are -10.24 and -18.92, respectively, which are lower than their true
mean qualities. This indicates that the market has pessimistic priors about both drugs when
they are first introduced into the market. It should also be noted that the initial prior mean
quality for Vaseretic is better than that for Zestoretic.
All of the preference parameter estimates are statistically significant. The price coeffi-
cient is not significant. This is not surprising because, as mentioned before, Canada provides
prescription drug coverage to patients who are 60 or older, and most of the patients who have
hypertension are elderly. The risk coefficient (r) is positive and significant, indicating risk-averse
behavior. In other words, an increase in the perceived variance of a product will lower the ex-
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pected utility of choosing it. However, the estimate for r is 0.05, which is quite small. Given
the functional form of the utility function, this implies that E[qj|I(t)] carries significantly more
weight than σj(t) in physicians’ choice.
The parameters associated with the measure of well-informed physicians are all statistically
significant. The estimate for β0 is -1.42, which implies that nearly 20 percent of physicians will
be well-informed about Ij(t) (i.e., Mj = 0.2) when G
I
j = 0. This represents the percentage of
physicians who keep up with the most updated information about ACE-inhibitor with diuretic
themselves even without any help from detailing. Recall that the average rate of forgetting is a
non-linear function of Mjt−1, which exhibits an inverted-U shape. The estimate of φI is close to
3%. The implied average rate of forgetting is shown in Figure 3. The average rate of forgetting
starts from 0% at aroundMjt−1 = 0.2. It increases and reaches the maximum of 2.1% at around
Mjt−1 = 0.6, and then declines. The estimate of β1 is 5.80e-05. In Figure 4 we plot its implied
rate of building Mjt without forgetting (i.e., φI = 0), conditioning on Mjt−1 and Djt = 1300,
which is the average per period detailing for both Vaseretic and Zestoretic in our sample. The
rate of building Mjt starts off at slightly above 6% when Mjt−1 is around 0.2 (i.e., GI = 0).
Then it declines almost linearly at the rate of 0.775% per 0.1 increase in Mjt−1.
Measures of well-informed physicians, expected qualities and perceived variances play cru-
cial roles in our model. They are also potentially important for marketing managers, who need
to make strategic decisions on how to allocate their sales forces. Although these variables are
not directly observed in the data, having explicitly modeled how these elements influence physi-
cians’ choice, we are able to recover them from the evolution of market shares and detailing
data. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the measures of well-informed physicians during the sam-
ple period. For Vaseretic, the measure of well-informed physicians starts off at around 0.57. It
increases to 0.7 after 30 months, and then gradually reduces to around 0.55 at the end of the
sample period. For Zestoretic, the measure of well-informed physicians increases from 0.3 to
around 0.85. Figure 6 shows how E[qj|I(t)] evolves during the sample period. For Vaseretic, it
increases slowly from around -5 to -2. For Zestoretic, it increases at a much faster rate from -18
to 23.15
15Since our estimate of r implies that σ2j (t) does not play an important role in physicians’ choice, we do not
report the evolution of σ2j (t) in the interest of space. It is available upon request.
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As for the pseudo-detailing policy functions, most of the parameters are statistically sig-
nificant except λ13, λ14, λ15, and λ22. The instrumental variable for Zestoretic (λ25) is positive
and significant while the instrumental variable for Vaseretic (λ15) is not significant. Both λ11
and λ21 are positive, suggesting that manufacturers respond to favorable information about
their own drugs by increasing the amount of detailing. λ23 is positive, which is consistent with
Zestoretic being the entrant. This suggests that the incentive to detail in order to build up M is
stronger than the disincentive to detail due to ∆uq21t < 0. This is consistent with our parameter
estimates, which imply |∆uq21t| ∗ I(∆uq21t < 0) is shrinking over time.
Also, both λj2 and λj4 are negative for j = 1, 2. This implies that Djt decreases as Mkt−1
increases. If manufacturers are rational and use the marginal impact of detailing on current
demand as a guide for determining their detailing efforts, the estimated signs of λj2 and λj4
suggest that the marginal impact of detailing on demand would decrease as Mkt increases.
Interestingly, using our parameter estimates, we simulate sequences of (∆sjt(I
p
k),∆sjt(Ik(t))),
and find that ∆sjt(I
p
k) > ∆sjt(Ik(t)) for all j, k and t. It follows from equation (17) that the
implied marginal return of detailing indeed decreases as Mkt increases. Overall, our results
suggest that the endogeneity problem of detailing exists in this market.
5.2 Goodness-of-fit
Our estimated model provides a good fit to the data. To illustrate this, we simulate 5000 se-
quences of quantity demanded (expressed in terms of number of prescriptions) for both Vaseretic
and Zestoretic using the demand model and the pseudo-detailing policy functions. We compute
the average predicted quantity by averaging simulated quantities. Figures 7 and 8 plot the
average predicted demand and the actual demand for Vaseretic and Zestoretic, respectively. In
general, the model is able to fit the diffusion pattern of demand very well. This indicates that
even though we only have four types of physicians in our model, it is flexible enough to fit the
data. Figures 9 and 10 plot the average predicted detailing minutes and the actual ones for
Vaseretic and Zestoretic, respectively. As we can see, the average predicted detailing minutes
is able to capture the data trend reasonably well. In particular, the average predicted detailing
minutes is able to mimic the observed fluctuation for Zestoretic. This is mainly due to the pos-
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itive correlation between detailing for Zestoretic and its instrument (total detailing minutes by
Zestoretic’s manufacturer in the cardiovascular category net the detailing minutes for Zestoretic)
used in the pseudo-detailing policy function.
5.3 Effectiveness of Detailing
5.3.1 The effect of a temporary increase in detailing
Measuring the effectiveness of detailing is important for managers because they often need to
decide how to allocate their sales forces. In this subsection, we discuss the effectiveness of
detailing using our parameter estimates. It is worth reiterating that Mjt and E[qj|I(t)] play
important roles in determining the marginal return of detailing in our model. Although these
variables are not directly observed in the data, we are able to use the estimates of our structural
parameters to generate them. We will first illustrate how the marginal impact of detailing on
current demand depends on them.
Notice that the marginal return of detailing for drug j not only depends on Ij(t) and Mjt,
but also I−j(t) andM−jt. To simplify the illustration, we setM1t =M2t for all t. In the baseline
case, we simulate 5000 histories of demand and I(t) by setting D1t = D2t = 1300 (the average
observed amount of detailing across both drugs) for t ≥ 1, and pjt at the average observed values
for all t. Recall that Vaseretic and Zestoretic enter the market before t = 1 (when our sample
begins). To ensure M1t = M2t and obtain the initial value of the information sets at t = 1, we
also set M1t = M2t = 0.5 for t < 1 in our baseline simulation. For t ≥ 1, Mjt is determined
by Djt. We evaluate the effects of a one-time increase in detailing at three different points in
time, based on the average expected qualities in the baseline simulation: (i) t = 1 when the
average expected quality for Vaseretic is higher; (ii) t = 23 when the average expected qualities
are about the same for both drugs; (iii) t = 60 when the average expected quality for Zestoretic
is higher. In each case, we increase the detailing amount by 50% for one of the drugs, holding
the other one fixed, and examine its effect on current demand.
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Panel 1 of Table 3 shows the results. For Vaseretic, the percentage changes in current
demand are 0.348%, 0.417%, and 0.414% at t = 1, 23, and 60, respectively. The effect at
t = 23 is higher than that at t = 1, mainly because E[q1|I(t)] increases from -5.52 to -3.68
during that period. However, the effect at t = 60 is about the same as that at t = 23 despite
the fact that E[q1|I(t)] improves from -3.68 to -2.06. One reason is that the average expected
quality of Zestoretic improves from -3.11 to 19.79 during that period, which is much more than
that of Vaseretic. This makes Vaseretic less attractive to physicians. Another reason is that
there is diminishing return in building up M1. During that period, M1 increases from 0.64 to
0.73. According to equation (17), a lower return in building up M results in a smaller effect of
detailing on current demand. We find a similar pattern for Zestoretic. The percentage changes
in current demand are 0.283%, 0.996%, and 0.903% at t = 1, 23, and 60, respectively.
It should be noted that at t = 23, the percentage change in current demand is much larger
for Zestoretic (0.996%) than for Vaseretic (0.417%) although the average expected qualities of
Vaseretic and Zestoretic are about the same. This is because the initial prior for Zestoretic’s
quality is lower than that for Vaseretic’s. Consequently, it follows from equation (17) that the
marginal impact of detailing is higher for Zestoretic.
The magnitudes of our detailing elasticities are consistent with Berndt et al. (1997).
According to their estimates, the upper bound of the elasticity of demand with respect to
cumulative detailing minutes ranges from 0.67 to 0.92.16 In our simulation above, a 50% increase
in detailing corresponds to increases of 2.6%, 1.9%, and 1.6% in cumulative detailing minutes
16Berndt et al. (1997) estimates the following equation using the data on anti-ulcer drugs in the U.S.:
log
(
njt
n1t
)
= β · log
(
GIjt
GI1t
)
+ · · · , (25)
where njt is the sales of drug j at time t, GIjt is the cumulative detailing minutes of drug j at time t, and drug
1 is the first entrant in this market. This equation implies that
εjj = β + ε1j , (26)
where εjk is the elasticity of demand for drug j with respect to cumulative detailing minutes of drug k. If εjk < 0
for j 6= k, β is the upper bound of εjj .
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at t = 1, 23, and 60, respectively. Thus our elasticity of demand with respect to cumulative
detailing minutes falls in a range between 0.1 and 0.6.17
5.3.2 Policy Experiment: A campaign that encourages sharing drug experiences
We now turn to discuss a policy experiment. In order to enhance the speediness of updating
the safety profile of drugs, public health agencies have been considering various measures to
encourage health care professionals and patients to share their drug experiences with them. For
example, Health Canada set up a program called MEDEffect to promote awareness about the
importance of filing reports using their on-line report system for the general public. It is likely
that such a program would increase the portion of experience signals revealed to the public
(correspond to an increase in κ in our model). How should marketing managers respond to this
kind of campaign? Given that we have obtained estimates for the structural parameters, we are
able to examine how the effectiveness of detailing would change if the government implements
such a campaign. To illustrate this, we re-simulate the effects of detailing in our model using the
procedure above by doubling the value of κ. Panel 2 of Table 3 shows the results. Compared with
the baseline case in Panel 1 of Table 3, the information set, I(t), has improved much quicker,
and the marginal returns of detailing from the current demand are also higher at t = 1, 23, and
60. In particular, the increases in the effectiveness of detailing are higher in the earlier part of
the product lifecycle. Given these results, marketing managers should consider increasing the
amount of detailing in this market if this campaign is carried out.
It is important to understand the intuition behind these results. They are mainly driven
by the pessimistic initial prior in this market. As more experience signals are revealed in each
period under this campaign, the expected qualities are revised upward more quickly over time.
Consequently, this shifts up the effectiveness of detailing. Following this argument, it should be
emphasized that the effectiveness of detailing could shift down under this campaign if a market
has optimistic initial prior about drug qualities. In that case, the expected qualities will be
revised downward more quickly over time.
17We do not compare our detailing elasticity with those implied by Narayanan et al. (2005) and Mukherji
(2002) because they use detailing expenditures instead of detailing minutes, which is used in our paper.
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The discussion above again highlights the difference between our model and the traditional
learning models, which assume that advertising/detailing signals and consumption experience
signals are substitutes for each other in updating the prior belief about product qualities. In
those models, increasing the value of κ will cause the marginal return of advertising/detailing to
decrease, which suggests that managers should reduce their advertising/detailing efforts. This
is just the opposite of what our model suggests, given our parameter estimates.
5.4 Robustness Checks
5.4.1 The Importance of Endogeneity of Detailing
Our estimates in the pseudo-detailing policy function suggest that detailing is endogenous.
However, it is hard to assess the economic significance of the endogeneity problem from the
estimates. To investigate the extent of the parameter bias if one fails to take the endogeneity
problem of detailing into account, we re-estimate the demand model without using the pseudo-
detailing policy functions. The parameter estimates are reported in Table 2, under Model 2
(demand only model). The estimate for β1 is 6.74e-05. This is higher than the estimate from
the base model (i.e., Model 1), which is 5.80e-05. The depreciation rate of the detailing stock,
φI , is 0.022. This is lower than the estimate 0.029 in the base model. A likelihood ratio test
rejects the hypothesis that the estimates of (β0, β1, φI) in the base model are the same as those
in Model 2. This suggests that the estimated marginal return of detailing is biased upward if
we do not take the endogeneity problem into account. To show the extent of the bias, we plot
the implied average rate of forgetting from the demand only model in Figure 3, and the implied
rate of buildingM in Figure 4. The average rate of forgetting is biased downward, with its peak
at 1.5% instead of 2.1%; the rate of building M is biased upward, starting at around 7% instead
of 6%.
To understand how the bias would affect the estimates of the effectiveness of detailing,
we repeat the exercise in Section 5.3 by using the parameter estimates from Model 2. We use
the same simulated values of I(t) and Mjt−1 at t = 1, 23, and 60 from the baseline simulation
in Panel 1 of Table 3. Conditional on these simulated I(t) and Mjt−1, we use the parameter
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estimates from Model 2 to simulate the effect of the one-time temporary increase in detailing.
The results, reported in Panel 3 of Table 3, confirm that the effectiveness of detailing would be
biased upward if we do not take the endogeneity into account. The extent of bias also appears
to be quite significant.
5.4.2 The Role of Persuasive Detailing
Sales representatives often give away gifts during their visits. Critics argue that these gifts may
affect physicians’ prescribing behavior although many physicians disagree. Our model so far
does not take this kind of “bribery” effect into account. One difficulty is that there is no data
on the amount of gifts given by sales representatives. Nevertheless, it is plausible that detailing
and the amount of gifts are positively correlated. As a robustness check, we follow Nerlove and
Arrow (1962) by incorporating a detailing goodwill stock, GP , directly into the utility function.
Following the economics literature (e.g., Leﬄer 1981, Hurwitz and Caves 1988), we refer to GP
as the persuasive detailing goodwill stock.18 We modify the physicians’ utility function as follows:
E[Uhijt|Ih(t)] = E[uijt|Ih(t)] + γGPjt, (27)
where γ captures the effect of GPjt. We construct G
P
jt in the same way as G
I
jt, but with a different
depreciation rate φP . Following Narayanan et al. (2005), we set φP to be 30% when estimating
other parameters. The estimation results are reported in Table 2, under Model 3. The coefficient
for the persuasive detailing stock, γ, is negative, but small and insignificant. This suggests that
persuasive detailing does not play an important role in influencing physicians’ choice in our
framework. The log-likelihood of Model 3 turns out to be very close to that of Model 1 –
the difference is less than 1. A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that γ is different
from zero. We interpret this as evidence that our results about how detailing depends on I(t)
and Mt are robust, and the persuasive component of detailing is negligible in the Canadian
ACE-inhibitor with diuretic market.
18Some researchers (e.g., Anand and Shachar 2005, Narayanan et al. 2005) refer to GP as the “direct” effect
of advertising/detailing. Some (Becker and Murphy 1993, Ackerberg 2001) refer to it as the prestige effect.
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Although our results may seem to contrast with those of Narayanan et al. (2005), who find
that the persuasive detailing stock in the utility function is positive and significant, our results do
not necessarily contradict their findings. Unlike our model, which separates the reminding role
of detailing from the “bribery” role, they combine both of them via GP in the utility function.
Thus, the significant and positive effect of GP found in their estimation could be mainly due to
its reminding role. This demonstrates an advantage of modeling the reminding role of detailing
more structurally: We are able to give more precise interpretations to our parameters. Moreover,
our results suggest that the modeling approach adopted here could avoid some counter-intuitive
implications by the traditional approach of incorporating advertising/detailing in the utility
function: Manufacturers can always raise their prices and maintain the demand unchanged as
long as they spend enough on advertising/detailing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a new structural model of physicians’ prescribing decisions and detail-
ing under quality uncertainty, which can be estimated using product level sales and detailing
data. We introduce a representative opinion leader, whose role is to update the most current
information about drug qualities based on past consumption experiences. Unlike the previous
literature which assumes detailing is a way to convey noisy signals about the true quality of
the drug to physicians, we assume that detailing changes the measure of physicians who are
informed of the current public information sets maintained by the representative opinion leader.
This allows our model to directly link the marginal return of detailing to the measure of well-
informed physicians and current public information sets. We also explicitly model physician
forgetting by allowing the measure of well-informed physicians to decrease if current detailing
is not sufficiently large.
We estimate our model using product level data on the ACE-inhibitor with diuretic market
in Canada. Our estimation approach, which makes use of a pseudo-detailing policy function,
allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of detailing. The results show that our model
is able to fit the diffusion pattern very well, the effectiveness of detailing depends on the current
31
information set and the measure of well-informed physicians, and the role of detailing-in-utility is
minimal. We examine how a public awareness campaign, which encourages physicians/patients
to report their drug experiences, would affect managerial incentives to detail. Given our param-
eter estimates, our model suggests that managers should increase the detailing efforts, whereas
the previous learning models suggest that managers should reduce the detailing efforts.
One limitation of this paper is that we do not explicitly incorporate data from clinical
trials outcomes and side-effect information. Conceivably, such data will be very valuable for
analyzing the effects of detailing. Also, we do not model how direct-to-consumer advertising,
journal advertising, free samples, and educational meetings or conferences sponsored by drug
companies may affect pharmaceutical demand. We leave modeling the role of these marketing
communication methods in the environment with two-sided learning for future research.
Another limitation is that we do not allow for heterogeneous opinion leaders in our model.
Some opinion leaders may obtain more past patients’ experiences than others, (perhaps some
work for larger hospitals and therefore are able to collect more patients’ experiences) and as
a result, they may possess different public information sets representing their various levels of
learning. Physicians may receive more influence from opinion leaders who are located in their
neighborhoods. Although these are attractive features, unfortunately, incorporating them will
dramatically complicate the model. One would also need a richer data set to estimate such a
model. Instead, our approach of using a representative opinion leader leads to a tractable model
which can be estimated simply using product level data. We hope future research will extend
our framework to allow for multiple representative opinion leaders. Another interesting research
direction is to use individual level data to examine the role of opinion leaders. A recent study
by Bhatia, Manchanda and Nair (2006) is taking this important step to examine the effects of
heterogeneous opinion leaders on physician decisions.
Our model can potentially help a marketing manager evaluate the future return of alter-
native long-term detailing strategies. Conditional on his/her own future detailing strategies and
his/her rivals’ future detailing strategies, we can take the uncertainty about true quality into
account by integrating out the prior distributions of q. However, when the marketing manager
changes his/her own detailing strategies, it is likely that his/her rivals will react and change
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theirs as well. Although our pseudo-detailing policy function approach allows us to correct the
endogeneity problem, it does not allow us to predict how rivals react when one changes his/her
own detailing strategy due to its reduced form nature. In order to utilize our demand model to
evaluate alternative future detailing strategies, we would need to combine it with a supply side
model explicitly. By developing a tractable demand side model, we hope that our framework
has laid some groundwork for this challenging research direction.
Finally, although we present our model in the context of pharmaceutical demand, it could
also be applied to other markets such as movies, video games, softwares, restaurants, etc.,
where both sides of the market are uncertain about how new products will perform, and opinion
leaders (e.g., professional critics) may play an important role in influencing consumer purchase
decisions. Given that data on reviews and critics are typically available in the public domain, it
is surprising that structural modeling of opinion leaders is relatively scarce. Our model could be
used as a starting point to analyze their roles and potentially improve our understanding about
how information is transmitted in markets other than prescription drugs.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
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Table 2: Parameter estimates
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Table 3: Effect of a one-time increase in detailing by 50% on current demand
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Figure 1: Total sales vs time
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Figure 2: Size of market vs time
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Figure 3: Rate of forgetting
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Figure 4: Rate of building the measure of well-informed physicians
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Figure 5: Measure of informed physicians
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Figure 6: Expected qualities
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Figure 7: Predicted and Actual Demand for Vaseretic
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Figure 8: Predicted and Actual Demand for Zestoretic
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Figure 9: Predicted and Actual Detailing Minutes for Vaseretic
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Figure 10: Predicted and Actual Detailing Minutes for Zestoretic
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
D
e
ta
il
in
g
 m
in
u
te
s
 (
Z
e
s
to
re
ti
c
)
Data Averaged predicted values
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
D
e
ta
il
in
g
 m
in
u
te
s
 (
Z
e
s
to
re
ti
c
)
Time (1-Mar 93, 72-Feb 99)
46
